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Abstract 
The emergence of macroprudential policies, implemented by central banks as a means of promoting 
financial stability, has raised many questions regarding the interaction between monetary and 
macroprudential policies. Given the limited number of studies available, this paper sheds light on this 
issue by providing a critical and systematic review of the literature. To this end, we divide the 
theoretical and empirical studies into two broad channels of borrowers - consisting of the cost of funds 
and the collateral constraint - and financial intermediaries - consisting of risk-taking and payment 
systems. In spite of the existing ambiguity surrounding coordination issues between monetary and 
macroprudential policies, it is argued that monetary policy alone is not sufficient to maintain 
macroeconomic and financial stability. Hence, macroprudential policies are needed to supplement 
monetary. Additionally, we find that the role of the exchange rate is critical in the implementation of 
monetary and macroprudential policies in emerging markets, whilst volatile capital flows pose another 
challenge. In so far as how the arrangement of monetary and macroprudential policies varies across 
countries, key theoretical and policy implications have been identified.  
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1 Introduction  
The prolonged effect of the recent global financial crisis has taught policymakers a valuable lesson, 
particularly central banks around the world, in their efforts to find a way to stabilise the economy and 
prevent the crisis from reoccurring. The emerging economic environment is believed to be subject to 
surges of financial imbalances that can potentially lead to economic stagnation and disinflation. A 
relatively new approach has been adopted, which is to implement both monetary and macroprudential 
policies to stabilise the economy. In this context, monetary policy is used as a means of achieving price 
stability; macroprudential policies predominantly focus on financial stability, whereas microprudential 
policy targets the safety and soundness of individual financial institutions. 
The introduction of the new stabilisation policies raises a number of questions relating to their 
effectiveness when interacting with monetary policy. For instance, it would be interesting to examine 
how macroprudential and monetary policies respond to technological/financial shocks, or to identify 
the transmission channels through which these policies interact to withstand such shocks. It would also 
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be interesting to establish the extent to which monetary and macroprudential policies need to be 
coordinated. 
In spite of the growing number of studies in this area, there is very little support for the 
macroprudential policy framework. In a broader sense, we lack a conceptual mechanism relating the 
implementation of monetary and macroprudential policies to the real economy, and to the financial 
system (International Monetary Fund, 2013). A comprehensive framework of monetary and 
macroprudential policy is required in order to provide some guidance to policymakers as to how they 
might achieve their objectives and enhance the transparency and accountability of the central bank.  
Moreover, in this context, it is argued that the payment system plays a significant role in 
promoting financial stability. The importance of payment system to the financial stability can be 
observed from how the central banks define the financial stability. Taking the definition of financial 
stability from the Bank of England as an example, which states financial stability is “the consistent 
supply of the vital services that the real economy demands from the financial system (which comprises 
financial institutions, markets and market infrastructures). Those services are: providing the main 
mechanism for paying; for goods, services and financial assets; intermediating between savers and 
borrowers, and channelling savings into investment, via debt and equity instruments; and insuring 
against and dispersing risk” (Bank of England, 2017, p. 32). In other words, the payment system is part 
of the financial system that needs to be preserved in order to enhance the efficiency of the financial 
markets and the financial system as a whole, hence boosting consumer confidence as well as enhancing 
economic interaction and trade in goods and services (Hasan et al., 2013). It is therefore important that 
we incorporate into our discussion on monetary and macroprudential policies the payment system as 
well.  
The right policy mix between monetary and macroprudential policies varies across countries. In 
the case of emerging markets, any external shocks - coupled with domestic shocks - affecting the 
financial system may disrupt the monetary transmission mechanism. In this context, capital flow 
volatility, which may be transmitted to the credit or exchange rate markets or both, needs to be taken 
into account.  
These premises raise fundamental questions about how a central bank promotes stability in the 
macroeconomy, specifically, how monetary and macroprudential policies interact, how the payment 
system relates to monetary and macroprudential policies, and what the impact of capital flows on 
monetary and macroprudential policies is. 
To address the aforementioned questions, this paper provides a critical systematic review of the 
literature on the interaction of monetary and macroprudential policies. Our objective is to identify the 
current policy debate in order to assist researchers as well as policymakers in identifying the relevant 
research questions to support policy design and implementation for the interaction of monetary and 
macroprudential policies.  
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Based on the results of the systematic search, 125 articles are assessed to tackle the initial review 
question3. After obtaining the relevant data and identifying the emergent themes and sub-themes, the 
articles reviewed in this section are classified into three broad categories. The first category discusses 
the mechanisms in which monetary and macroprudential interact. The second category includes papers 
which discuss the open-economy setting, which incorporates the role of the exchange rate and the 
impact of capital flows. The final category includes papers which discuss a framework of capital control 
measure following the current experience of the emerging markets. Although some aspects of these 
categories may not be distinct but partially overlap, each represents the conceptual framework of how 
monetary policy connects to macroprudential policies, where financial intermediation has been 
identified as one of the critical elements in this framework of the policy mix (Bernanke et al., 1999; 
Goodfriend and McCallum, 2007). 
This review makes three specific contributions. First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first paper that utilises a systematic literature review approach in this area; secondly, it provides a 
comprehensive analysis of the theoretical foundations of the interaction of monetary and 
macroprudential policies; and thirdly it offers a comprehensive analysis of how monetary and 
macroprudential policies have been implemented in both advanced economies and emerging markets. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 touches on the elements linking monetary 
and macroprudential policies. Section 3 highlights the role of the exchange rate in the framework of 
monetary and macroprudential policies whilst section 4 assesses the implications of capital flow. 
Finally, section 5 provides some concluding remarks and ideas for future research.   
2 Interlink between Monetary and Macroprudential Policies  
Broadly speaking, all the reviewed studies build their explanation of the interaction of monetary 
and macroprudential policies through the role of the financial sector in amplifying shocks to the 
economy. Previously, the financial sector was abandoned by mainstream business cycle models (see 
Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007) for example). However, the recent global 
financial crisis has delivered a very blunt message regarding how financial shocks may have 
implications for the economy. What we observe from all the reviewed studies is that the financial shocks 
affect the borrowers’ side by limiting their credit eligibility, which in turn reduces credit demand. At 
the same time, financial shocks also affect the financial intermediaries, particularly through their 
balance sheet, which in turn affects their credit supply.  
These two entities (borrowers, lenders/financial intermediaries) form the conduit through which 
the interlinking mechanism between monetary and macroprudential is explored. By virtue of the latter, 
we classify the studies we have reviewed accordingly, i.e. borrowers’ cost of funds and collateral 
constraint mechanism on the borrowers’ side, and balance sheet, risk appetite and payment system on 
                                                          
3 Details of the systematic literature review methodology can be found in Appendix A. 
4 
 
the financial intermediaries’ side. Figure 1 depicts the interaction channels of monetary and 
macroprudential policies whilst Tables 1 and 2 summarise selected theoretical and empirical studies in 
the area. 
Figure 1 The interaction channels of monetary and macroprudential policies 
 
 
Table 1 Interaction of monetary and macroprudential policies: selected theoretical studies 
Study Main Questions Channel/Mechanism Main Conclusion 
Bailliu et al. (2015) Should central banks also 
respond to financial imbalances, 
such as those associated with 
unsustainable credit expansion 
and asset-price bubbles? 
Cost of funds  Welfare is higher where policy makers 
respond to financial imbalances using the 
policy rate and/or a macroprudential tool, 
compared to a standard Taylor rule, in 
regimes, particularly in the presence of 
financial shocks.  
Merola (2015) To what extent have financial 
factors accounted for the U.S. 
output collapse during the 
recent crisis? 
Cost of funds The recent crisis has enhanced the financial 
accelerator as a mechanism of propagation and 
amplification of business cycles. 
De Paoli and Paustian 
(2013) 
How should monetary and 
macroprudential policy be 
coordinated to stabilise the 
macroeconomy? 
- Cost of funds 
- Collateral constraint 
Policy authorities should cooperate and 
commit when the economy is hit by cost-push 
shocks. When monetary and macroprudential 
tools are set independently and under 
discretion, the economy needs to have one of 
the authorities act as a leader, as this can 
mitigate coordination problems. Choosing 
monetary and macroprudential tools that work 
in a similar fashion can increase such 
problems. 
Bianchi et al. (2012) What is the impact of the 
interaction between financial 
innovation, credit frictions and 
imperfect information on the 
design and effectiveness of 
macroprudential policy? 
Collateral constraint Financial innovation can overcome the 
collateral constraint. However, imperfect 
information in the new financial regimes may 
distort the debt decision and asset prices. The 
regulators need to acquire a better set of 
information than the private agents to issue a 
macroprudential policy that contains the 
amplitude of the boom-bust cycle. 
Shi (2015) Can exogenous shocks to such 
liquidity be an important cause 
of the business cycle? 
Collateral constraint The paper argues that a negative shock to asset 
liquidity or firms' collateral constraint causes 
aggregate investment, employment and 
consumption to fall with the output.  
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Study Main Questions Channel/Mechanism Main Conclusion 
Iacoviello (2005) How can financial frictions 
explain the aggregate time-
series evidence and be used for 
monetary policy analysis? 
Collateral constraint The collateral constraint amplifies demand 
shocks but stabilises supply shocks to the 
economy. Monetary policy which reacts to 
asset prices does not give any significant 
welfare gain.  
Rubio and Carrasco-
Gallego (2014) 
What are the implications of a 
macroprudential loan-to-value 
tool for business cycles, 
financial stability, and welfare, 
and what are those of its 
interaction with monetary 
policy? 
Collateral constraint The combination of macroprudential and 
monetary policies achieves a more stable 
financial situation and macroeconomy. 
Welfare is improving in the case of a non-
cooperating situation between monetary and 
macroprudential policies. 
Brzoza-Brzezina et al. 
(2015) 
What is the impact of the 
introduction of occasionally 
binding constraints (OBC) into 
models with financial frictions 
and macroprudential policy? 
Collateral constraint A large macroprudential tightening can have a 
much stronger impact on the economy than a 
loosening of the same size.  
Quint and Rabanal 
(2014) 
What is the optimal mix of 
monetary and macroprudential 
policies in an estimated two-
country model of the euro area 
Collateral constraint Macroprudential rule would help 
macroeconomic stability, enhance welfare, 
and partially substitute for the lack of national 
monetary policy. Macroprudential policy 
effects on borrowers depend on the shock that 
hits the economy.  
Borio and Zhu (2012) What is the interaction between 
capital regulation, the business 
cycle and the transmission 
mechanism? 
Risk-taking Insufficient attention has so far been paid to 
the link between monetary policy and the 
perception and pricing of risk by economic 
agents—termed the “risk-taking channel” of 
monetary policy. 
Angelini et al. (2014) What are the consequences of 
introducing a time-varying 
capital requirement, on 
macroeconomic performance 
and stability, and what is its 
interaction with monetary 
policy? 
Risk-taking In the presence of supply shocks, time-varying 
capital requirements help to stabilise the 
fluctuation of the loan-to-output ratio. Lack of 
cooperation between monetary and 
macroprudential policies may cause excessive 
volatility in the policy instruments. In the 
presence of financial shocks, a time-varying 
capital requirement helps to stabilise the 
output and the loans-to-output ratio, regardless 
of their coordination. 
Barnea et al. (2015) To understand the connections 
between monetary and 
macroprudential policies. 
Risk-taking Monetary policy can be used to address 
financial stability, and macroprudential policy 
can also be employed to stimulate the 
economy, particularly in the situation where 
the interest rate reaches zero. There is a trade-
off in the policy tools that needs to be 
understood by the policymaker. 
Gerali et al. (2010) To understand the role of 
financial frictions and banking 
intermediation in shaping the 
business cycle in the euro area. 
Risk-taking Balance-sheet constraints establish a link 
between the business cycle, which affects bank 
profits and thus capital, and the supply and 
cost of loans. The banking sector and sticky 
rates diminish the effects of monetary policy 
shocks. Financial intermediation increases the 
propagation of supply shocks. A significant 
reduction in bank capital may have a 
significant effect on the economy.   
Agénor and Aynaoui  
(2010) 
What are the implications of 
excess bank liquidity for the 
effectiveness of monetary 
policy? 
Risk-taking Excess liquidity conveys greater stickiness to 
the deposit rate in response to a monetary 
contraction and induces an easing of collateral 
requirements on borrowers – which in turn 
may translate into a lower risk premium and 
lower lending rates. 
Angeloni and Faia 
(2013) 
How do bank regulation and 
monetary policy interact in a 
macroeconomy that includes a 
fragile banking system? 
Risk-taking Risk-based capital requirements amplify the 
cycle and reduce welfare. The best 
combination includes anticyclical capital 
ratios (Basel III) and the response of monetary 
policy to asset prices or bank leverage. 
Angelini et al. (2014) What are the consequences of 
introducing a time-varying 
capital requirement on 
macroeconomic performance 
and stability? 
Risk-taking During the presence of a technology shock, the 
capital requirements may not be beneficial for 
stabilising the economy compared to monetary 
policy. In the presence of financial shocks, the 
capital requirement helps to stabilise the target 
variables. However, a lack of coordination 
between these two policies may cause 
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Study Main Questions Channel/Mechanism Main Conclusion 
excessive volatility in both the monetary 
policy and the capital requirement.  
 
Agénor et al. (2013) What are the roles of bank 
capital regulation and monetary 
policy in mitigating 
procyclicality and promoting 
macroeconomic and financial 
stability? 
Risk-taking A combination of a credit-augmented interest 
rate rule and a Basel III-type countercyclical 
capital regulatory rule may be optimal for 
promoting overall economic stability. 
Benes and Kumhof 
(2015) 
Developing theoretical models 
of banks and macroprudential 
policies such as the Basel III 
regime. 
Risk-taking A countercyclical capital buffer leads to a 
significant increase in welfare. It also reduces 
the need for countercyclical adjustments in 
policy interest rates. 
Valencia (2014) What is the link between 
monetary policy and banks' risk-
taking incentives in a dynamic 
bank model and under what 
conditions can risk-taking be 
excessive? 
Risk-taking Lower monetary policy rates can worsen or 
reduce these incentives depending on the size 
of the shock when equity financing is ruled 
out. Capital requirements are closer to the 
source of the distortion and thus work better 
than loan-to-value caps in reducing excessive 
risk-taking. 
Piazzesi and Schneider 
(2018) 
How to model the determination 
of securities prices and inflation 
in an economy with a layered 
payment system that supports 
trade in both goods and 
securities. 
Payment system Securities markets matters for both the supply 
and the demand of inside money. Securities 
are held by banks to back inside money, which 
is in turn used by other investors to pay for 
securities. As a result, securities prices, 
inflation, and policy transmission depend on 
the institutional details of the payment system. 
Williamson (2003) To study the role of the central 
bank in a model which 
permits alternative types of 
payment arrangements. 
Payment system A private clearing house arrangement 
improves efficiency but produces a real 
indeterminacy. The pricing of daylight 
overdrafts is irrelevant for the equilibrium 
allocation. 
 
Table 2 Interaction of monetary and macroprudential policies: selected empirical studies 
Study Main Questions Channel/Mechanism Methodology Data Main Conclusion 
Chang and 
Dasgupta (2007) 
How shocks to some 
business segments affect 
investment in a firm's 
non-shock segments. 




(1979 to 1997) 
A fall in the collateral value of 
assets contributes to the 
increase in financial constraints 
faced by these firms and the 
decline in investment in the 
non-shock segments. 
Cecchetti et al. 
(2017) 
Does prolonged 
monetary policy easing 
increase the vulnerability 
of the domestic and off-




(1998 Q1 to 
2014 Q4) 
The leverage ratio and other 
measures of firm-level 
vulnerability increase for banks 
and non-banks as domestic 
monetary policy easing persists. 
The increasing vulnerability is 
also found in the financial sector 
firms outside of the U.S. as the 
result of monetary easing in the 
U.S. 
Aiyar et al. 
(2016) 
How does the credit 
supply respond to 
monetary policy and 
bank minimum capital 
requirements? 









(1999 Q1 to 
2006 Q4) 
There is little evidence of 
interaction between these two 
policy instruments. The 
findings do not confirm 
theoretical models that raise 
concerns about complex 
interactions between monetary 
policy and macroprudential 





What are the effects of 
both monetary shocks 
and macroprudential 
shocks on aggregate 
financial fragility in the 





(1960 Q1 to 
2007 Q4) 
Contractionary monetary policy 
aggravates financial fragility 
whereas credit-constraining 
macroprudential shocks may be 
able to reduce the credit-to-
GDP ratio in the short run when 
interest rates are fixed. 
However, when the interest rate 
is free to accommodate the 
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Study Main Questions Channel/Mechanism Methodology Data Main Conclusion 
macroprudential shock, this 
reduces financial fragility and 
suggests there may be gains 




Are efficiency of 
interbank payment 
systems and credit 
creation linked? 








(1995 to 2005) 
Payment reforms were an 
important precondition for the 
credit expansion in the sample 
countries. Payment system 
reforms also led to a shift away 
from cash (outside money) and 
towards demand deposits 
(inside money) as a medium of 
exchange, and this, in turn, 
enabled an expansion of credit 
in the sample countries. 
2.1 Borrower Channel 
Within the borrower channel, we identify from the surveyed literature two main mechanisms by 
which monetary policy interacts with macroprudential: the borrowers’ cost of funds mechanism and the 
collateral constraint mechanism.  
2.1.1 Cost of Funds Mechanism 
Bernanke et al. (1999) offer an insight into how endogenous development in the credit market escalates 
and proliferates shocks to the macroeconomy – termed as the financial accelerator. This amplifying 
effect of credit markets can be explained by the relationship between the external finance premium (the 
difference between the cost of funds acquired externally and the opportunity cost of funds internally) 
and the net worth of potential borrowers (the difference between borrowers’ liquid assets and the 
collateral value of illiquid asset excluding outstanding obligations). This financial accelerator may 
explain the output contraction in 2008 in the U.S., as well as the broadening in the spread between the 
central bank’s policy rate and the cost of funds faced by entrepreneurs, and why financial conditions 
have amplified the U.S. business cycle and the intensity of the recession (Merola, 2015). 
Using Bernanke et al.'s (1999) approach, Bailliu et al. (2015) examine the interaction of monetary 
and macroprudential policy. They assume that the financial shock affects the firms’ cost of funds. 
Asymmetric information between the borrower and the lender causes the development of a financial 
market imperfection due to the inability of the lender to spot the idiosyncratic shock for the 
entrepreneur. Both monetary and macroprudential policy are activated by signs of developing financial 
imbalances, for which deviations of credit growth from its steady-state value are used as a proxy. 
Monetary policy uses Taylor’s rule, which lets the policy interest rate also respond to deviations of 
credit growth from its steady-state value. The macroprudential policy is modelled as the exogenous 
component of the external finance premium and assumed to have a direct influence on the funding costs 
of firms (via the external finance premium). 
Bailliu et al. (2015) report that the interaction between monetary and macroprudential policies 
improve welfare gains. Furthermore, macroprudential policy is a better tool with which to stabilise the 
macroeconomy than monetary policy in the presence of financial shocks. However, macroprudential 
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policy neutralises the effect of monetary policy in episodes of technology shocks. Therefore, monetary 
policy needs to respond more than it would without the presence of macroprudential policy. 
In addition, De Paoli and Paustian (2013) argue that the insertion of macroprudential policy into 
the policy toolkit to manage the macroeconomy enhances the outcome regardless of shocks. However, 
they suggest that policymakers need to be cautious in selecting their monetary and macroprudential 
instruments. Choosing monetary and macroprudential tools that work in a similar way may lead to a 
significant welfare loss. They argue that the loan-to-value ratio is analogous with a time-varying tax on 
borrowing, which in turn increases/decreases the cost of funds. This characteristic works in a similar 
way to the interest rate, which can lead to a conflict between monetary and macroprudential policies 
and contribute to significant welfare losses. 
2.1.2 Collateral Constraint Mechanism 
Another strand of the literature dealing with the non-financial borrowers’ channel focuses on the 
collateral restraint that borrowers must face (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). In this model, fixed assets – 
such as land – act not only as an input to production but also as collateral. Lenders require collateral to 
reduce the risk of non-payment. Borrowers receive loans equal to the present value of their collateral. 
Thus, borrowers have to deal with the collateral constraint if they want to expand their projects, since 
their assets may be limited. Changes in borrowers’ collateral values amplify the impact of monetary 
shocks on prices and the supply side. An increase in the lending rate increases the monitoring effort and 
increases the collateral-loan ratio. Chang and Dasgupta (2007) present empirical evidence of this 
collateral constraint channel. They find that a decrease in the collateral value exacerbates financial 
constraints faced by firms and reduces investment. 
This constraint may cause an alteration in the composition of investment from long-term to short-
term, while, in turn, decreasing the growth and amplifying the shock (Aghion et al., 2010). In addition, 
financial innovation4 allows the value of the collateral to increase while at the same time exposing the 
risk arising from volatility of collateral requirements or the loan-to-value ratio (Bianchi et al., 2012). A 
negative shock to asset liquidity or firms' collateral constraint can cause aggregate investment, 
employment and consumption to collapse with output (Shi, 2015). In addition, Abo-Zaid (2015) 
concludes, using U.S. data in a New Keynesian model with collateral constraint, that long-run inflation 
is around 1.5% when the economy faces a total factor productivity (TFP) shock and about 2.5% when 
the economy is hit by mark-up shocks.  
In the presence of a collateral constraint in the Euro Area, Quint and Rabanal (2014) demonstrate 
that macroprudential measures enhance welfare by reducing macroeconomic volatility; 
macroprudential measures help to reduce the leverage of both borrowers and banks. As a result, the real 
variables, such as output and consumption, are less volatile and generate cheaper lending rates and 
increased welfare. 
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Iacoviello (2005) connects the collateral constraint to the housing market, by using real estate as 
collateral for loans. He argues that, under a positive demand shock, the upswing in housing prices 
increases the borrowers’ capacity to ask for higher loans so as to spend and invest more. However, 
Iacoviello (2005) only observes monetary policy, without the presence of macroprudential policy. He 
argues that monetary policy that responds to asset prices does not result in any significant advantages 
in terms of output or inflation stabilisation. Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014) then take the Iacoviello 
(2005) approach further by combining monetary and macroprudential policy. They include the loan to 
values requirement, as a macroprudential instrument, in the context of the conventional Taylor rule of 
monetary policy. The loan-to-value requirement is a constraint on the value of a loan relative to the 
underlying collateral, which in this case is residential property. This macroprudential instrument acts as 
a rule that reduces the loan-to-value ratios, thereby discouraging credit expansion. Rubio and Carrasco-
Gallego (2014) find that the interaction of monetary and macroprudential policy enhances welfare. 
The collateral constraint is assumed by Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2015) to be occasionally binding, 
which means that it does not play a significant role near to the steady state, but becomes binding in the 
presence of large negative shocks in the economy. Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2015) demonstrate 
asymmetric effects of financial frictions and find that significant tightening of the loan-to-value ratio 
can have a much stronger impact on the economy than a loosening of the same size. In contrast, small 
policy innovations, whether expansionary or contractionary, have effects of almost equal magnitude. 
The introduction of loan-to-value ratios along with monetary policy mildly decreases the volatilities of 
most variables, including house prices, while at the same time substantially reducing fluctuations in 
household debt. 
2.2 Financial Intermediaries Channel 
In this strand of the literature, the banking sector is found to play a major role in amplifying 
shocks to the macroeconomy. We identify two mechanisms in our surveyed literature through which 
financial intermediaries (such as banks) play a role in the interaction of monetary and macroprudential 
policy: banks’ risk-taking (balance sheet) and payment systems. 
2.2.1 Banks’ Risk-Taking (Balance Sheet) Mechanism 
The surveyed papers focus on how monetary and macroprudential policy affect the risk-taking 
behaviour of financial intermediaries which operate under restrained liability and asymmetric 
information. According to Borio and Zhu (2012), banks’ risk perception and tolerance are influenced 
by changes in the policy rates. An easing of monetary policy leads banks to increase their leverage and 
lower their monitoring (Cecchetti et al., 2017; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2014).  
Borio and Zhu (2012) argue that the capital position is the nexus of the banks’ risk-taking attitude 
in terms of their lending and their leverage position. Given the capital position of the bank, a capital 
requirement influences bank behaviour through the capital threshold effect and the capital framework 
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effect (Borio and Zhu, 2012)5. The capital threshold effect occurs due to the high cost banks have to 
pay, including the costs of restraining supervisory action, damage to reputation and negative market 
reaction, when a bank breaks the minimum capital requirement. The capital framework effect works on 
the basis that banks have to adjust their portfolios in response to changes in the capital requirement, 
given their attitude towards risk and their assessment of risks. 
In order to provide further insights into the interaction between capital requirements and 
monetary policy, Angeloni and Faia (2013) point out that the risk-based capital requirement – a 
microprudential-based approach6 – augments the cycle and causes an attenuation of welfare in its 
interplay with monetary policy during an economic downturn. Under a low-interest-rate environment, 
where risk-taking behaviour by banks can be excessive, a capital requirement constraint also works 
better than a loan-to-value ratio constraint (Valencia, 2014). The loan-to-value ratio regulates the 
leverage of borrowers, while a capital requirement regulates the banks’ leverage. Forcing banks to use 
their internal funding to finance the borrowers may restrain the excessive risk-taking behaviour of 
banks. 
In the case of banks facing monopolistic competition, Gerali et al. (2010) argue that loan margins 
are determined by the banks’ capital-to-asset ratios and by the degree of interest rate stickiness. Banks 
receive funding in return for issuing deposits, provide collateralised loans to both households and firms, 
and build up their capital from retained earnings. Excess liquidity may also convey greater stickiness 
on the deposit rate in response to a monetary contraction, and generate an easing of collateral 
requirements for borrowers – which in turn may transform into a lower risk premium and lower lending 
rates (Agénor and Aynaoui, 2010).  
Banks may support a stable business cycle because their monopolistic position promotes the 
ability of financial intermediation to shield economic agents from fluctuations in market rates by 
moderating the impact of non-financial shocks. However, a bank may also introduce additional 
volatility into the business cycle due to the shocks that come from the credit market vis-à-vis collateral 
constraints and the relationship between the loan margin and capital-to-asset ratios (Gerali et al., 2010). 
In addition, Mimir (2016) finds that financial shocks to the banking sector contribute significantly, not 
only to financial variables such as bank credit and deposits, but also to the observed dynamics of 
macroeconomic variables such as output and consumption. In order to moderate the banks’ tendency to 
amplify the cycle, a countercyclical capital requirement should be considered, and coordinated with the 
monetary policy (Agénor et al., 2013). Agénor et al. (2013) argue that a standard Taylor’s rule interest 
rate policy, enhanced with credit growth and countercyclical capital requirements, may be an optimal 
option for achieving macroeconomic stability.  
                                                          
5 Borio and Zhu (2012) provide an extensive survey of the interaction of monetary policy and the capital requirement. 
6 The risk-based capital adequacy ratio as suggested in the Basel II accord. 
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In more detail, the central bank is confronted with a policy trade-off when it uses either the policy 
interest rate or the capital requirements, but not both, in order to diminish the effect of the shock – either 
a shock to expected inflation or financial stability. The effectiveness of the monetary transmission 
mechanism from the policy rate to the bank lending and deposit rates is influenced by financial stability 
policy tools, such as reserve requirements and capital ratio requirements (Barnea et al., 2015). During 
the ‘normal’ period – when the dynamics of the economy are dominated by supply-side shocks – the 
active use of capital requirements has an insignificant impact on the output volatility and inflation, 
despite generating a smaller loan-to-output ratio fluctuation (Angelini et al., 2014). During a period of 
financial shocks, countercyclical capital requirements provide beneficial support to monetary policy. 
Therefore, countercyclical capital requirements reduce the volatility of the policy rate (Benes and 
Kumhof, 2015).  
A different view is taken, however, by Cao and Chollete (2017). More specifically, using the 
game-theory approach, they observe a reduction in the central bank’s welfare due to the trade-off 
between maintaining price stability and financial stability. This approach links the bank’s leverage to 
the financial and real shock. A positive real economy shock increases marginal productivity and moves 
the production function upward. The increasing marginal productivity drives the marginal return on 
capital and makes banks increase their credit supply. In a similar vein, a negative financial shock cuts 
the credit supply. Monetary policy contraction may reduce the financial imbalance, but monetary policy 
expansion may lower the probability of insolvency. Therefore, Cao and Chollete (2017) argue that the 
larger the correlation between real and financial shocks, the more likely it is that the central bank has 
to face the trade-off between maintaining price and financial stability. 
2.2.2 Payment System Mechanism 
An alternative approach to analysing the role of the financial sector is offered by Goodfriend and 
McCallum (2007), an approach labelled as the banking accelerator. In contrast to the financial 
accelerator, the banking accelerator integrates the liabilities side of the banking sector to amplify shocks 
to the macroeconomy. The credit mechanism in this model is connected to the deposit side of the 
banking system. Given a negative shock in the macroeconomy which increases the external finance 
premium, a customer may have to liquidate his deposits in the banking sector. This reduction in the 
deposit side may cause the banking sector to increase the external finance premium even further. 
Furthermore, this deposit side of banking liabilities is used as a payment medium (inside money) 
for customers, along with cash (outside money). Piazzesi and Schneider (2018) argue that banks will 
face a liquidity management problem due to their inability to protect themselves against liquidity shocks 
caused by payment instructions from the customer. Different types of payment systems, such as real-
time gross settlement (RTGS) or net settlement, may require different types of liquidity management. 
Banks’ issuance of inside money determines the value of collateral held by banks, and the nominal price 
level required to cover the liquidity shocks. A loosening monetary policy may increase the asset price, 
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which is the collateral the banking sector requires to engage in the payment system. Paying an interest 
rate on banks’ reserves in the central bank offsets this effect, and increases welfare, but only when 
transaction costs are small (Bencivenga and Camera, 2011). 
Merrouche and Nier (2012) argue that the efficiency of interbank payment systems relates to 
credit creation. Such efficiency may affect the creation of credit through at least one of the following 
two channels. First, innovations in the interbank payments technology enhance the reliability of inside 
money (holdings of deposits) as a payment medium for customers, and deposits are intermediated by 
the banking system. An increase in the supply of deposits to the banking system can, in turn, lead to a 
shift in the supply of credit to the economy. Second, innovations in interbank payment systems help to 
establish well-functioning interbank markets for end-of-day funds by reducing unsettled payments 
(Williamson, 2003). In addition, Hasan et al. (2013) find that moving to electronic retail payments has 
stimulated consumption and trade across the European Union. 
Concerns about the risk associated with payment systems are increasing in tandem with the 
increased fragility of the banking industry following the recent global financial crisis. Freixas and Parigi 
(1998) demonstrate that the capital requirements of banks will provide a buffer in both RTGS and net 
settlement in terms of the necessary reserves and contagion risk7. To tackle the liquidity problem and 
avoid systemic risk, many central banks provide intraday overdrafts as collateral. Allowing banks to 
take out free intraday loans from the central bank relieves the credit constraints in the payment system. 
In combination with monetary policy, a central bank can explore the trade-off effects of liquidity 
constraints against the increases in priority afforded by collateralization (Kahn and Roberds, 2001; 
Lacker, 1997). In addition, a surge in the implicit intraday interest rate suggests an increased opportunity 
cost of pledging collateral intraday, and can be used as an indicator to measure the pressure in the 
payment system (Jurgilas and Žikeš, 2014). 
2.3 Coordination between Monetary and Macroprudential Policy 
One crucial factor that needs to be considered is the coordination between monetary policy and 
macroprudential policy. There is an increasing amount of discussion exploring this coordination (Smets, 
2014). The current institutional arrangement of these two policies varies across countries. In advanced 
countries, such as the UK, the central bank is in charge of macroprudential policy. Meanwhile, the 
Financial Supervisory Authority takes this role in Sweden and Australia. Concern over the introduction 
of macroprudential policy may lead to a coordination problem, not only in countries where different 
institutions would be responsible for setting up monetary and macroprudential policy, but also in those 
with a single institution responsible for both. In addition, Tinbergen dogma states that only one policy 
is needed for one objective. 
                                                          
7 Gross settlement means all payments are settled directly (real time) according to incoming/outgoing transactions, whereas 
net settlement means all payments are settled at the end of the day by deducting the outgoing from the incoming payments. 
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However, the abandonment of this Tinbergen rule has been called for by the Committee on 
International Economic and Policy Reform (2011). Close coordination between monetary and 
macroprudential policies needs to be ensure to enhance macroeconomic stability. During the presence 
of a cost-push shock, close coordination between them is needed to enhance welfare (De Paoli and 
Paustian, 2013). Even when these policies are set by two different institutions, there is a need for the 
leaders of these institutions to enhance welfare. A lack of coordination between macroprudential and 
monetary policy may generate unnecessary volatility of the policy instruments (Angelini et al., 2014). 
This unnecessary volatility occurs because these policy instruments work on the same channel with 
different objectives, and try to influence targeted variables such as bank rates and credit in conflicting 
directions. Therefore, the effect of one policy may cancel out the other’s action.  
This view is supported empirically by Greenwood-Nimmo and Tarassow (2016), who call for 
coordination between monetary and macroprudential policy. They argue that, in the absence of 
monetary policy, macroprudential policy may only be able to reduce one component of financial 
fragility in the short run. However, when used alongside monetary policy, macroprudential policy may 
diminish financial fragility. 
However, this view is challenged by Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014). They argue that 
monetary and macroprudential policy operated in a non-coordinated fashion improve welfare more than 
if they are coordinated. Moreover, allowing each policymaker to concentrate on their own objective 
leads to more effective results in terms of achieving stability. In addition, Aiyar et al. (2016) do not find 
any complex relationship between monetary and macroprudential policy.  
3 The Role of the Exchange Rate in a Monetary and Macroprudential 
Framework 
One of the distinct characteristics of emerging markets is exchange rate volatility, especially for those 
countries that have substantial debt in foreign currency. Exchange rate volatility is less relevant for 
financial stability in advanced economies, but asset price volatility remains a threat (Korinek and 
Sandri, 2016). The exchange rate amplifies the shocks through both its volatility and level. The volatility 
of exchange rates poses a challenge to financial stability through three main channels (Agénor, Alper 
and Pereira da Silva, 2014). First, large currency movements can disrupt exchange rate expectations 
which, in turn, lead to sudden changes in capital flows and generate high fluctuations in local-currency 
debt and equity markets. Second, currency depreciation can aggravate the currency mismatches of 
domestic borrowers with large foreign-currency debt exposures, which may undermine their 
creditworthiness. Third, large depreciation can be related to deterioration in external funding conditions 
during a crisis. The level of the exchange rate can amplify the shocks because it influences how much 
foreign lenders value domestic collateral (Korinek and Sandri, 2016). A depreciation of the exchange 
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rate reduces the value of collateral and initiates a feedback loop of tightening constraints and further 
exchange rate depreciation. This feedback loop is pictured in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 Feedback loop of financial crises with exchange rate depreciation 
 
Source: Korinek and Sandri (2016) 
In order to respond to the question of whether a country should abandon a floating exchange rate 
regime in the case of large capital reversals, Fornaro (2015) introduces a theoretical framework that 
demonstrates that domestic agents borrow from the international markets using fixed assets as collateral. 
In the case of a sudden stop – significant capital outflows from the country – the value of this collateral 
shrinks. As a collateral constraint takes place, the economy falls into recession. Fornaro (2015) finds 
that monetary policy that responds to development in the financial system and spreads between 
domestic and foreign bonds delivers a better result for welfare compared to strict inflation targeting. In 
addition, there is a tendency for a central bank to deviate from its strict framework, allowing free 
exchange rate movement and engineering exchange rate depreciation, to maintain the value of collateral 
used to gain access to credit. Furthermore, a fixed exchange rate regime leads to substantially higher 
welfare losses during a financial crisis episode (Gertler et al., 2007). 
Foreign exchange intervention has been actively used as a policy tool in many economies in Asia 
and elsewhere. Nevertheless, countries that employ foreign exchange intervention may still implement 
an inflation-targeting framework. The intervention itself can be communicated as restraining the 
exchange rate volatility or even targeting a certain level. However, it is found that intervention tends to 
be a discretionary action rather than a policy rule (Jun, 2008). A managed exchange rate regime relaxes 
the constraint on the degree of response to inflation, and alleviates problems of indeterminacy and 
expected instability (Llosa and Tuesta, 2008). Cavoli and Rajan (2015) state that, while sterilisation 
weakens the capital inflow effect on interest rates, it may even strengthen the foreign interest rate effect. 
Small open economies that implement either a fixed exchange rate regime or strict inflation targeting 
manage to stabilize the real exchange rate and inflation at the expense of significant instability in the 
real economy (Alba et al., 2011). 
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Turning to the empirical evidence, on the basis of Norwegian data Akram and Eitrheim (2008) 
suggest that output stability and financial stability can be improved simultaneously. However, monetary 
policy faces a trade-off between inflation and output stability. Consistent with the theoretical approach, 
an interest rate response to excessive inflation of house prices, equity prices and credit will also increase 
stability in consumer price inflation and output. However, when interest rates react to a misalignment 
in the nominal exchange rate, the stabilising effect of the exchange rate on inflation and output is 
counteracted by the destabilising impact of increased interest rate volatility. 
4 Capital Flows Volatility – A Challenge for Monetary and 
Macroprudential Policies 
The massive volatility of capital flows, following the unconventional monetary policy applied in 
advanced countries, has provided challenges for policymakers, in terms of restraining capital flows from 
aggravating overheating pressures and consequent inflation, and mitigating the risk that protracted 
periods of easy financing conditions will threaten financial stability (Unsal, 2013). Under a restriction 
in foreign banking operations, international banking flows to the foreign non-bank private sector fall 
when the bank entry barriers increase, and interbank lending rises. After the liberalisation of capital 
inflows, domestic banks have to face fierce competition from foreign funds. Agents have to take on 
excessively risky forms of finance, and expose the economy to extreme systemic risk (Korinek, 2010). 
Domestic banks reallocate their lending to non-financial business, or they may take on riskier projects, 
and a few unlucky banks may become insolvent due to asymmetric information. If investors fail to 
appreciate the quality of bank assets, banks may accumulate losses even if investors expect a banking 
crisis. A few banks accumulating losses may, therefore, disrupt the credit market and even disrupt 
solvent projects. This disruption is likely to lead to an output loss, even if there are no illiquidity 
problems (Giannetti, 2007). This capital inflow is subject to a ‘sudden stop’, which can be portrayed as 
reversals of international capital flows reflected in sudden increases in net exports and the current 
account. The reversal of capital inflows may precipitate a decline in production and absorption, and 
lead to corrections in asset prices (Mendoza, 2010). 
In the case of volatile capital flows, monetary and macroprudential policies can supplement each 
other, and these policies are not perfect substitutes (Unsal, 2013). Broad macroprudential measures – 
such as the loan-to-value ratio – are more effective than macroprudential measures that target capital 
flow. In addition, financial shocks have a more significant impact on inflation and output under a fixed 
exchange rate regime vis-à-vis a flexible exchange rate where appreciation of the nominal exchange 
rate facilitates a restraint on the overheating and inflationary pressures. In addition, macroprudential 
measures in the form of capital flow management contribute to a reduction in the elements that make 
up financial vulnerability, such as bank leverage, inflation expectations, bank credit growth, and 
exposure to portfolio liabilities (Forbes et al., 2015). 
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In seeking further insights into the international transmission of asymmetric shocks, Dedola and 
Lombardo (2012) build a two-country model with financial frictions along the same lines as Bernanke 
et al. (1999). They highlight that foreign exposure in interconnected balance sheets can, indeed, act as 
a powerful mechanism propagating asymmetric shocks across countries. Integration of asset markets 
will magnify the financial and real interdependence, even with minimal balance sheet exposure to 
illiquid foreign assets for financially constrained agents, provided that asset markets are integrated. A 
high degree of integration in the relevant asset classes stimulates a tendency towards the cross-border 
equalisation of external finance premia faced by financially constrained investors due to the no-
arbitrage conditions it imposes, thus exposing a tight connection between leverage and macroeconomic 
dynamics across countries.  
A somewhat different perspective is taken by Medina and Roldós (2014). In addition to the 
banking accelerator, they address a shock stemming from an extended period of zero-bound interest 
rates by introducing a simulation model. The simulation illustrates a long period of inflows – 
representing low interest rates – succeeded by capital outflows which reflect the normalisation of 
unconventional monetary policy in advanced economies. They argue that a countercyclical reserve 
requirement enhances the effectiveness of monetary policy in reducing asset price volatility and, hence, 
improves welfare. 
Looking at a different transmission channel, Agénor et al. (2014) develop a dynamic stochastic 
model of a small open economy. This model describes firms that are allowed to borrow from a domestic 
bank, while the bank borrows from the rest of the world, with a two-level banking intermediation 
structure, a risk-sensitive regulatory capital regime, and imperfect capital mobility. Countercyclical 
capital regulation is effective at promoting macro stability and financial stability. However, a 
countercyclical regulatory capital rule may need to be complemented by other, more targeted 
macroprudential instruments when shocks are large and persistent, because the advantage in terms of 
reduced economic volatility displays diminishing returns. 
Glocker and Towbin (2012) advocate the use of a reserve requirement as an important policy 
instrument in many emerging economies. The interest rate complemented by the reserve requirement 
can be useful in stabilising economic activity in the context of a small open economy which is subject 
to sticky prices. The use of a reserve requirement becomes more effective when the banking sector is 
subject to legal reserve requirements – more specifically, when financial frictions, foreign currency debt 
and an objective of the authority to stabilise credit are all present. However, the presence of capital 
controls reduces the effectiveness of reserve requirements. This finding differs from those reported in 
earlier studies by De Gregorio et al. (2000), who argue that the effect of reserve requirements in terms 
of restraining capital inflows is limited, although they may alter the composition of capital inflows, 
from short-term to long-term. 
Samarina and Bezemer (2016) argue that capital flow controls can be implemented to tame 
massive capital inflows. However, such measures need to consider the effect of capital inflows on 
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growth and financial system stability, and the importance of sectoral destination in determining the 
effects of capital flows. Foreign capital flows into economies with few investment opportunities may 
substitute for domestic bank lending to non-financial businesses, so that bank balance sheets become 
more dominated by household lending. In particular, greater dependence on domestic investment before 
crisis exacerbates the credit crunch that occurs during crisis, while exposure to foreign direct investment 
alleviates the liquidity constraint (Tong and Wei, 2011). 
As noted above, Forbes et al. (2015) argue that macroprudential measures in the form of capital 
flow management may reduce financial vulnerabilities stemming from bank leverage, inflation 
expectations, bank credit growth, and exposure to portfolio liabilities. However, they also report that 
this reduction only lasts for six months and then reverses. In addition, such capital flow management 
measures have a limited effect on most other macroeconomic variables and financial market volatilities 
over the short and medium term, including equity indices, inflation, interest-rate differentials, and the 
volatility of exchange rates and portfolio flows. Based on data from India, Patnaik and Shah (2012) 
argue that the introduction of capital controls can reduce debt flows when price, quantitative and 
administrative controls are imposed, in the framework of a financial regulatory regime where all 
financial transactions are illegal unless explicitly permitted. There is a trade-off between lower 
unhedged foreign currency borrowing by households and firms, and a lower regulatory burden on 
financial markets. 
Korinek and Sandri (2016) focus on the difference in impact between capital control and 
macroprudential policies. Capital controls are applied exclusively to financial transactions between 
residents and non-residents, whereas macroprudential regulation limits domestic agents to borrowing 
from either domestic or foreign lenders. The difference is shown in Figure 3. Korinek and Sandri (2016) 
argue that utilising both capital controls and macroprudential policies to complement monetary policy 
may moderate contractionary exchange rate depreciation. The macroprudential regulation aims to 
reduce the amount and riskiness of all financial liabilities, and capital controls aim to increase the 
aggregate net worth of the economy by restraining net inflows. These measures generate an interest 
differential between the domestic and international credit markets, and encourage domestic saving. 
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Figure 3 Capital control versus macroprudential regulation 
 
Source: Korinek and Sandri (2016) 
Empirical testing of the impact of capital controls has yielded mixed results for different periods 
of observation. On the one hand, Edison and Reinhart (2001) observe that capital controls in Brazil and 
the Philippines, during the 1999 crisis and 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis respectively, did not 
succeed in restricting capital flow volatility. Furthermore, countries with capital controls have a high 
probability of experiencing a financial crisis (Glick and Hutchison, 2005). On the other hand, Chamon 
and Garcia (2016) find that capital controls in Brazil may have helped to tame a bubble in the economy. 
Restricting the access to foreign financing, however, may have contributed to the low investment and 
growth performance during that period, given the low domestic saving rate of the Brazilian economy. 
One of the characteristics of capital controls is that they tend to be kept in place for an extended period. 
Authorities seldom use this instrument to tackle short-term fluctuations in output, the terms of trade, or 
financial-stability considerations. 
Ostry et al. (2012) investigate whether macroprudential policies and capital controls can enhance 
financial stability in the face of the risks typically associated with large capital inflows. In order to 
analyse this, they compose new indices of foreign-currency-related prudential measures, domestic 
prudential measures, and financial-sector-specific capital controls for 51 emerging market economies 
over the period 1995–2008. They point out that both capital controls and foreign-currency-related 
prudential measures are related to a decline in the proportion of foreign exchange lending within total 
domestic bank credit and in the proportion of portfolio debt within total external liabilities. Other 
prudential policies provide support in terms of limiting the intensity of aggregate credit booms. 
The increasing number of central banks that employ capital flow management measures – in the 
form of either macroprudential measures or capital controls – need to take into account the adequacy of 
their international reserves (Jeanne, 2016). Massive capital inflows into emerging market countries are 
subject to reversal. Thus, the authorities must preserve the possibility of fire-sales, which can be caused 
by the Value-at-Risk constraint in the global banking system. Sudden stops in capital inflows are 



















tackling this problem is to manage international reserves by absorbing the capital inflows and supplying 
the market during the outflow episode. 
In order to implement macroprudential policy in an environment where the financial sector has 
been connected globally, international macroprudential policy coordination is critical (Agénor and 
Pereira, 2018). Shocks are not only transmitted from advanced countries to emerging countries and the 
rest of the world, but also originate from emerging countries and affect advanced countries and the rest 
of the world. These shocks may also have a spillback that provides the policy originators with the 
motivation to consider the effect of their policy to the rest of the world in their decision making process. 
Agénor and Pereira (2018) highlight that cross-border arbitrage and leakages are other factors that 
should be considered for strengthening international policy coordination. In addition, implementing 
different types of policies in different countries to increase global welfare requires global coordination. 
5 Conclusions and Future Research Directions 
In view of the preceding discussion, it becomes apparent that the extant body of literature on 
monetary and macroprudential policies is still in its infancy. An extensive debate between scholars is 
still ongoing as to whether financial friction affects the macroeconomy, and also how to factor financial 
stability into a framework of macroeconomic stability. The studies reviewed in this paper suggest that 
monetary policy alone is not sufficient to maintain the stability of the macroeconomy, given the 
complexity of the current economic environment.  
As demonstrated above, financial intermediation appears to be playing a significant role in the 
achievement of financial system stability as well as macroeconomic stability. Despite the fact that 
macroprudential policies have, in many countries, played a major role since the global financial crisis, 
there is as yet limited experience of the practice of such policies (Galati and Moessner, 2013). A 
substantial range of macroprudential instruments has been discussed without a primary instrument 
having been recognised. Macroprudential instruments tend to be customised according to the challenges 
a particular country has to face (Claessens, 2015).  
The systematic review of the literature performed in this study points to several promising 
avenues for future research: (a) The inclusion of several macroprudential instruments, such as the loan-
to-value ratio and the multiple versions of reserve requirements which are implemented in several 
countries, will improve our knowledge of the framework of monetary and macroprudential policies. (b) 
As the systematic literature review highlights the importance of maintaining the exchange rate – both 
its level and volatility – along with the stability of the economy, it is recommended that foreign 
exchange intervention is incorporated in the framework of monetary and macroprudential policies. As 
the review findings point out, such intervention is mainly performed on a discretionary basis. Central 
banks, particularly in emerging markets, need to factor foreign exchange operation into the framework 
of monetary and macroprudential policies. (c) Given the importance of the payment system for 
providing the foundation for settlement and credit supply, there is little evidence on the role of the 
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payment system in the context of a monetary and macroprudential framework of analysis. It may be 
interesting to explore whether a policy regarding the payment system, such as electronic transfer fees 
or limitations on the nominal value to be settled in the large payment system in the central bank, would 
have an impact on either macroeconomic or financial stability, or both. (d) It is also envisaged that a 
review paper on the implementation of monetary and macroprudential policies in an open-economy 
setting and the international aspect of macroprudential policy would be of great interest to both 
academics and policymakers.  
Finally, a question that still begs an answer revolves around the effectiveness of monetary and 
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Appendix A. Methodology 
To assess the interaction of monetary and macroprudential policy, the Systematic Literature Review 
(SLR) approach was adopted. SLR is a methodology that pinpoints current studies, chooses and assesses 
analyses, contributions and data syntheses, and reaches clear conclusions about what is known and 
unknown (Denyer and Tranfield, 2009). Unlike narrative reviews, the SLR offers a more rigorous and 
clear review process by following procedures that incorporate comprehensive searches for all possible 
significant studies (Thomé et al., 2016), and an audit trail of all research stages in a scientific and 
transparent manner (Tranfield et al., 2003).  
SLR has been used in psychology, medical and social science research to deliver in-depth 
answers to specific research questions and thereby support policymaking and implementation (Thomé 
et al., 2016). Given the complexity of the assessment area and the need to deliver a comprehensive 
result to scholars, practitioners and policymakers, it was believed that the SLR approach would be a 
suitable approach for responding to these challenges. 
A.1. Review Strategy 
This paper focuses on tackling the review question of how monetary and macroprudential policies 
interact to achieve price stability and financial stability in the economy. In line with the general principle 
supporting the SLR methodology, the above question was formulated into a review protocol (Tranfield 
et al., 2003). This protocol covers information relating to the steps we followed to conduct our reviews, 
which were performed in two stages. First, inclusion and exclusion criteria regarding the literature for 
the survey were developed. Pursuing the review question and sub-questions, the literature needed to 
include an assessment of both monetary and macroprudential policies. However, we anticipated this 
literature as being limited in size, since the strand is still developing (Galati and Moessner, 2013). 
Therefore, we also considered other forms of monetary policy or macroprudential literature that develop 
our knowledge of the interaction of monetary and macroprudential policies. In order to provide a robust 
examination, sources were limited to English peer-reviewed journals, representing high-impact, 
validated knowledge (Podsakoff et al., 2005). Moreover, an approach was followed which was 
somewhat similar to those of Meier (2011) and Savino et al. (2017), in that we considered only 
publications in scholarly journals with an Impact Factor greater than or equal to the median Impact 
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Factor for the related category (in this case: Economics, Business, Finance and Management) in the 
2015 Journal Citation Reports® (Thomson Reuters, 2015)8. There was no restriction regarding the 
definition of a monetary regime, so that we could acquire a comprehensive understanding around this 
subject. Similarly, the search was not limited to a particular country or research method. 
Second, keywords were designed consistent with the selection criteria. The search objective was 
to be as comprehensive as possible, to avoid overlooking potentially important studies. In order to 
formulate the list of keywords, the author carefully scrutinised the keywords of the positioning study 
review. This process resulted in a list of 70 keywords, which were divided into several groups 
representing the exploratory areas: monetary policy, macroprudential policy, capital flows, inflation, 
unemployment, and payment system9. Each group was combined with the Boolean operator “AND” to 
give search strings relevant to the review question and sub-questions we intended to explore, as 
described in Figure 4. 
Figure 4 Search strings 
 
A.2. Data Collection 
After defining a clear review strategy, the following step in the SLR process involved the selection of 
pertinent studies. A selection of keywords were applied to selected databases, namely ABI/INFORM 
Complete, EBSCO Business Source Complete and Web of Science. This initial search resulted in a total 
of 16,414 hits. Then, 12,542 citations were excluded because of duplication and failure to meet the set 
criteria. The final sample comprised 3,872 references to be assessed based on title and abstract. By 
examining the title and abstract based on the inclusion and exclusion criteria, we omitted 3,404 of these 
references. 
                                                          
8 See Appendix B for the detailed inclusion and exclusion criteria. 





























The following step in our review was to perform a full-text analysis for the remaining group of 
468 articles. After performing a careful assessment on the basis of the inclusion and exclusion criteria, 
we classified the references into A (highly relevant), B (moderately relevant) and C (non-relevant). This 
resulted in 105 articles being classified as highly relevant. To extend our search, given the 
aforementioned constraint of there being a limited number of studies in this research stream, we 
examined the reference sections of all the included articles, to find relevant studies we had not obtained 
through our keyword search. This procedure added 20 more articles to our sample. Figure 5 presents a 
summary of our selection process. 
Figure 5 Summary of the selection process 
 
The distribution of the 125 articles in the final sample, by journal title, is presented in Table 3. 
The Journal of International Money and Finance, the International Journal of Central Banking and 
Economic Modelling are the dominant journals for the discussion of the research topic, accounting for 
10%, 10% and 9% of the overall sample, respectively. Figure 6 portrays the number of articles in the 
sample by year of publication, ranging from 1997 to 2016. It can be argued that this review topic is a 
relatively new area, and the increasing number of studies, reflecting a growing interest in this topic, 










% of Total 
Sample 
Journal of International Money and Finance 11 10% 
International Journal of Central Banking 11 10% 
Economic Modelling 9 9% 
Journal of Financial Stability 8 8% 
Journal of Monetary Economics 7 7% 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 7 7% 
Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 6 6% 
International Review of Economics & Finance 5 5% 
Journal of Banking & Finance 5 5% 
Journal of International Economics 5 5% 
IMF Economic Review 4 4% 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 3 3% 
Economic Policy 2 2% 
American Economic Review 2 2% 
Journal of Development Economics 2 2% 
Journal of Policy Modeling 2 2% 
European Economic Review 2 2% 
Journal of Political Economy; Economic Theory; Quarterly Journal of 
Economics; Review of Economic Studies; Journal of Financial 
Intermediation; Review of Financial Studies; Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics; Annual Review of Economics; Economic 
Inquiry; Journal of Corporate Finance; Annual Review of Financial 
Economics; Review of International Political Economy; Journal of 
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